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     
Philosophical Foundations for
Complementary Protection
Matthew Lister
A significant percentage of the people outside their country of citizenship
or residence who are unable to meet their basic needs on their own, and
need international protection, do not fall under the definition set out in
the UN Refugee Convention. This has led many – both academic com-
mentators and activists – to call for a new, expanded refugee definition,
preferably backed up by a new, binding, international convention. In
earlier work, I have resisted this call, arguing that there is good reason to
pick out a sub-set of those in need of international aid – a set that largely, if
not completely, corresponds to those picked out by the Refugee Conven-
tion – for special benefit and protection. However, even if Convention
refugees are in some ways special, we are left with the question of what, if
anything, is owed to those in need of aid who are not Convention refugees.
In this chapter, I set out philosophical foundations for so-called comple-
mentary protection.
Following Jane McAdam, I take ‘complementary protection’ to
be protection ‘to persons falling outside the formal legal definition of
“refugee”’, where this protection is seen as ‘complementary to those
assumed under the  Refugee Convention (as supplemented by its
 Protocol)’. I will argue that while states which are able to provide
such protection at reasonable cost have an obligation to do so, the different
sorts of threats faced by those in need of complementary protection will
typically justify providing a different sort and a different degree of protec-
tion than that provided to Convention refugees, at least in usual cases.
I will explain why and how complementary protection may differ from
 Thanks to Luara Feraccioli, Michael Sevel, Kevin Walton, Patrick Emerton, David Tan, Jayani
Nadarajalingam, Suzy Killmister, Maria O’Sullivan, and, especially, Christine Straehle and David
Miller for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
 J. McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ), pp. –.

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refugee protection, and the limiting cases when the protection offered
must converge.
 What Is Complementary Protection, and Why Is It Needed?
As used in this chapter, ‘complementary protection’ is international pro-
tection provided by a state to a non-citizen who is outside her or his
country of citizenship or habitual residence who is not covered by the UN
Refugee Convention. This protection therefore potentially covers people
fleeing from natural disasters and environmental degradation (such as
drought); many people fleeing from international or civil wars; people
fleeing from generalized violence, perhaps, but not necessarily relating to
societal breakdown; and some people fleeing crime. Importantly, comple-
mentary protection is appropriate in these cases when the need to flee is
not caused by persecution on the basis of a protected ground recognized
under the Refugee Convention (race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion). Any of the above situations
is one where persecution on the basis of a protected ground is possible, and
if it exists, then we have a straightforward case for refugee protection.
Many people in situations like the above will not, however, be fleeing
persecution on the basis of a protected ground. This can be because the
danger is from a natural process such as a hurricane or volcano, or because
the danger is directed at everyone in an area merely because they are in the
area, and not because the person in question has a protected trait. Finally,
the danger might be directed at the person in question individually, such as
 In this chapter I will typically use the term ‘refugee’ to mean people falling under the UN Refugee
Convention definition of a refugee unless otherwise noted. I do this not to attempt to solve
normative questions by definition, but for the sake of terminological ease and consistency.
 After this point, I will use ‘county of citizenship’ to mean ‘country of citizenship or habitual
residence’.
 I will not here give any significant space to protection provided under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). This is not because the CAT is unimportant – it often is in practice, because of its
unconditional prohibition on non-refoulement, allowing at least minimal protection for people who
would otherwise be excluded under the Refugee Convention or complementary protection on
various exclusion grounds, and is important theoretically in setting an absolute limit on state
discretion on immigration controls. However, as most who qualify for protection under the CAT
would also qualify for protection either under the Refugee Convention or under complementary
protection if no exclusion ground applies, I will largely leave this issue aside.
 I have argued that people fleeing certain natural disasters – ones reasonably expected to be long-term
or open-ended, where internal relocation is not a viable option – should be given the same treatment
as Convention refugees, given that they meet what I take to be the logic of the Refugee Convention.
See M. Lister, ‘Climate Change Refugees’, Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy,  (), –. I maintain this position, but will here consider primarily natural
or environmental disasters of a more limited sort.
  
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when criminals or gangs in a weak or failed state target business owners or
more prosperous members, but not because the person in question has a
protected trait.
The common element for complementary protection, then, is being in
need of international protection, while being outside one’s country of
citizenship, where the danger that necessitated the flight is not connected
with persecution on the basis of a protected ground. The lack of persecu-
tion is primarily what distinguishes these cases from cases of refugee
protection. Before going on to explain the importance of this difference,
I will explain why we should think of complementary protection, as
discussed in this chapter, as applying only to people outside their country
of citizenship, and not to all people in need of aid, regardless of their
location. The answer to this question is related to the type of aid provided
by complementary protection. As will be discussed in more detail later, the
basic remedy provided by complementary protection is the ability to enter
into and remain in a safe country for a set period of time. (How the period
of time changes – and may, at the limit, become indefinite or permanent –
in different circumstances is a topic for later in the chapter.)
Aid given to people in need while they remain inside their country is
not, therefore, complementary protection in the sense discussed here.
Because providing aid to people in situations of the sort noted above while
they remain inside their country has different predictable costs, it has a
different normative structure. In some cases, aid in place may be cheaper,
at least in the long run, than providing complementary protection. This is
arguably so in the case of natural disasters that are serious in the short term
but that do not present ongoing threats. Such situations do present
significant difficulties in determining which states should bear the cost of
providing aid, a problem eliminated, or at least ameliorated in the first
instance, when people in need of aid present themselves at the frontier. In
other scenarios, providing aid in place may be of such difficulty or cost that
it is unclear that requiring it can justified. Intervention into many civil or
international wars will often fit this description, especially when we note
that intervention is far from certain to improve the situation, as the
ongoing conflict in Syria shows.
Aid given to people who either are already in a safe country or arrive at a
frontier is different. It is easy to assign first responsibility (even if effective
burden-sharing remains a goal for the future), and the amount of risk one
 When we consider that most people do not typically wish to leave their homes, the desirability of
providing aid in place when possible increases.
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must undertake to provide the aid is comparatively small. The level of aid
that must be provided will clearly depend on the resources of the host
country in question (it would not make sense to expect or require Uganda
to provide the level of aid that Germany can), and there may be upper
limits to the amount of aid that can be required (to rule out the largely
theoretical spectre of a society being ‘swamped’), but because the sort of
aid required by complementary protection is well suited to the situations
where it is applied, it makes sense to apply it in those situations.
 How Does (or Should) Complementary Protection
Differ from Refugee Protection?
Having described the basic nature of complementary protection above, we
may now ask how it differs (or should differ) from protection for Conven-
tion refugees. That there should be any difference is a contested issue. Jane
McAdam, the leading expert on complementary protection, has argued
that ‘a legal status equivalent to that accorded by the Refugee Convention
ought to apply to all persons protected by the extended principle of non-
refoulement’ and that ‘there is no legal justification for differentiating
between the status of Convention refugees and the status of beneficiaries
of complementary protection’. I will argue that there is good moral reason
to distinguish between refugees, narrowly understood, and those owed
complementary protection. This moral difference is in turn able to ground
a justification for different legal treatment as well.
Differential treatment for those granted complementary protection and
those granted refugee protection would potentially be justified if there
were normally or usually predictable differences between the groups. My
account of what is special about refugees provides a basis for such a
difference. As I have elsewhere noted, in the case of people who are
persecuted on the basis of a protected ground, we have good reason to
think, first, that the danger that the people face is not likely to be short
term; second, that there is usually no way to end the danger to them other
than by giving them a new permanent residence; and, finally, that alterna-
tives to providing a new permanent residence are unlikely to be morally
acceptable or cost–benefit justified.
 McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .
 On Convention refugees, see M. Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’, Law and Philosophy,  (),
–. On people fleeing certain long-lasting natural events, not currently covered by the Refugee
Convention, see Lister, ‘Climate Change Refugees’.
  
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The case is different for those covered by complementary protection, as
set out in this chapter. In these cases, we can typically expect that the
danger faced by those protected in this way will be not of indefinite
duration but of a significantly shorter period. We may also hope that the
danger faced can be addressed by means of aid or intervention at accept-
able moral and monetary costs by other states, facilitating a return home
by those so protected. Because the rights those in need can claim are
related in a close way to the nature of the danger they face, there is
therefore good reason to provide a different set of rights to those granted
complementary protection rather than refugee protection.
Some examples can help make the case clearer. Because I have elsewhere
set out the argument that, in the case of those eligible for refugee protec-
tion under the Refugee Convention, we cannot reasonably expect the
danger faced to be short term (in the relevant sense), and so must provide a
‘durable solution’ – that is, a new state in which permanent residence and
eventually full membership is available – I will not rehash those arguments
here. I will argue that, in the case of people who do not fit under the
Refugee Convention (or certain extensions that I have argued for), we can
usually, or typically, expect that temporary protection will suffice. If this is
so, and if what we owe people in need is connected with how we are best
able to help them, then there is some justification for treating comple-
mentary protection as distinct from refugee protection, at least insofar as
this difference of need persists, a point to which I will return.
This is not the only possible justification for treating complementary
protection as distinct from refugee protection. Matthew Price, for example,
has argued that asylum – refugee protection as applied to Convention
refugees – is and should be normatively different from other sorts of aid to
people in need in that it essentially involves a political rebuke to govern-
ments who engage in persecution. Furthermore, cases of government
action that justify asylum, on Price’s account, signify a breaking of the
normative bond between the state and the person persecuted. These two
factors are missing in cases where complementary protection is needed. In
these cases, we are often dealing with states that are unable to provide the
protection needed, either in the short term or for a somewhat longer
period. A state is not properly rebuked, Price argues, for being unable to
 See Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’ and ‘Climate Change Refugees’.
 See M. E. Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, ), p. . Price’s ‘political rebuke’ account is unorthodox in rejecting the so-called nexus
requirement for asylum, but this need not concern us here.
 Ibid., p. .
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protect its citizens. And, in these cases, the bond between the state and the
citizen is not fundamentally ruptured in the way it is when the state
persecutes its own citizens. When these factors are considered together,
Price argues, we see that what is owed to people who qualify for comple-
mentary protection is temporary assistance, not the granting of a new
nationality.
Jane McAdam, on the other hand, has insisted that ‘there is no legal
justification for distinguishing between the status of Convention refugees
and beneficiaries of complementary protection’. Given this, McAdam
argues, we should see the Refugee Convention not as picking out a special
group of people in need of aid in a special way (as both Price and I have
argued from different grounds), but as a lex specialis, which sets standards
as a sort of example that ought to apply equally to all people in need of aid,
regardless of the source of their need. If McAdam’s claim is merely that
there is no legal requirement found in international law that would compel
treating Convention refugees and those who receive complementary pro-
tection differently, then she is arguably correct. But, insofar as her claim
is that there is no good reason for different treatment, I will attempt to
show it is mistaken. Furthermore, the moral differences, when joined with
certain pragmatic considerations, provide good reason for not establishing
a legal regime providing the same protections to those found to be
Convention refugees and those in need of complementary protection, at
least not in the first instance. (Limits to this claim will be discussed later.)
 Distinguishing Complementary Protection from Refugee
Convention: Arguments from Political Morality
Recall that on my account of refugees, those in need of refugee protection
are picked out by the particular nature of their need – it is such that we can
reasonably expect the need to be long-lasting, or at least of indefinite
duration, and there is no good way to meet the need at acceptable cost
and risk except by providing a new nationality to the people in need. I have
argued that those covered by the Refugee Convention are paradigm
 McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .  Ibid., p. .
 McAdam recognizes that states do not in fact typically give the same protection to Convention
refugees as to others in need of aid, and that this difference is enshrined in many legal schemes
providing some sort of complementary protection. McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .
Given the role that state practice plays in determining international law, this is arguably relevant for
the legal issue, placing tension on McAdam’s strong claims about the law. However, on its own this
is of only modest importance to the moral and political question addressed in this chapter.
  
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examples of such people, although at least some people displaced by
environmental harms also clearly fit. On other accounts of refugee protec-
tion, such as Price’s ‘political rebuke’ account, or Max Cherem’s account
focusing more specifically on persecution, people covered by the Refugee
Convention are also picked out as especially in need of the sort of ‘durable
solution’ provided for in refugee protection, particularly in countries such
as the United States, Canada, and, in certain cases, Australia.
Some examples can help illustrate why the case of those in need of
complementary protection can typically be expected to be different from
Convention refugee protection. I will offer several scenarios. Consider first
people who must flee from one country to another because of a natural
disaster which effects one part of their country, leaving other parts safe, but
which makes it impossible or highly dangerous, in the short term, for the
people fleeing either to remain in their home country or to flee to another
part of their country. We might imagine people in a mountainous border
region impacted by heavy rains leading to flooding, landslides, and impass-
able roads to safe regions in their own country, but having safe passage to a
neighbouring country. In such a case, principles of complementary pro-
tection would call for admitting the people in need; providing them with
short-term lodging, food, and other basic supplies; and helping them
return either to their home region or to other safe regions in their home
country when the immediate danger has passed. In a case like this, it is
clear that there is no need to provide the sort of long-term protection and
access to new membership called for by Convention refugee protection.
Other types of natural or environmental danger may be more wide-
spread, impacting all or most of a state (the recent earthquakes in Haiti or
Honduras after Hurricane Mitch might be good examples). Here the
whole territory of the state is rendered unsafe, at least for a period, and
people need longer protection, at least until aid can be provided in-
country. Because the whole territory is impacted in cases like this, it is
 M. Cherem, ‘Refugee Rights: Against Expanding the Definition of a “Refugee” and Unilateral
Protection Elsewhere’, Journal of Political Philosophy,  (), –.
 The United States provides permanent resident status to refugees or asylees who have been in the
United States for one year and who remain refugees ( USC. § (b)). Most people deemed
‘protected persons’ in Canada (a category in some ways broader than the Convention refugee
definition) may apply for permanent resident status as soon as they are so designated. See www
.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/
guide--applying-permanent-residence-within-canada-protected-persons-convention-refugees.
html#E. In Australia, those who meet the refugee definition are eligible for ‘permanent’ visas
at the time of the decision. For discussion, see J. Vrachnas et al., Migration and Refugee Law:
Principles and Practice in Australia, rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ),
pp. –.
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less plausible to facilitate return to a safe part of the country. However,
even in severe cases, such as that with Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, with
the implementation of direct aid to the countries, they may become safe
enough within a predictable time frame so as to justify making comple-
mentary protection presumptively temporary. In many cases like this, if
people are required to return, even if aid is provided, they will return to a
country facing significant difficulty and probably lower standards of living.
However, as what is owed to those seeking complementary protection is
not any particular standard of living, but only a reasonably safe place to
live, then the presumptive ability of the state in question to return to
minimally acceptable standards, at least with outside aid, in foreseeable
periods of time, again helps show why complementary protection may be
presumptively temporary, as opposed to Convention refugee protection.
Next consider countries faced with war, either international war or civil
war. In such cases, people may be cut off from safe parts of the state, if they
exist, necessitating flight into a neighbouring state. Or the whole state may
be unsafe, making anyone who flees a potential beneficiary of comple-
mentary protection. The ongoing struggle in Syria is a clear example, but
fighting in the Balkans, in the Caucuses, in Central Africa, and other
countries provide all-too-numerous examples. In the case of any war, it is
hard to know how long it will last, and so of course it would be foolish to
assume that only relatively short-term protection would be needed. How-
ever, it is not unusual for wars to last a relatively short time. This again
gives some good reason for the presumptive protection provided by
complementary protection to be limited in duration, unlike Convention
refugee protection.
Finally, consider people who flee from generalized societal breakdown
or widespread criminal activity that is beyond the power of the govern-
ment to control. Somalia, Libya, and several Central American states
might here provide us with examples. These cases are perhaps the hardest
to fit into my model, as we have limited experience with reviving failed
states or bringing such widespread criminality under control. Perhaps these
cases might fit with the more extreme cases of environmental or natural
 In fact, in the case of Honduras and Hurricane Mitch, Temporary Protected Status (‘TPS’) in the
United States persisted for more than twenty years, to the current time, leading to significant
controversy over its pending removal by the Trump administration. The situation in Honduras has
been complicated by the rise of powerful criminal gangs, making this no longer a pure case. To my
mind, the repeated extensions of TPS for Hondurans was likely itself a mistaken policy, but one
that, when put in place, gave rise to new obligations, as discussed later.
 The wars in the Balkans, for example, lasted from ten days to a bit less than four years.
  
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disasters I have claimed should be seen as fitting into the logic of the
Refugee Convention. Even here, however, we might rather take a more
conservative approach, hoping to use outside aid to restore the countries to
sufficient stability (as doing so is somewhat less likely to be unduly costly
than is intervention into a functioning society), and hold that presump-
tively temporary protection of the sort provided by complementary pro-
tection should be the first step.
At this point it is important to note two complications to my account so
far, and show how they do not invalidate the general approach. First, we
should note that, in each of the sorts of cases I have discussed above, it is
possible that at least some of the people involved – perhaps a significant
percentage of them – will in fact qualify as Convention refugees. This is
because none of these scenarios, as described, is incompatible with people
suffering, or having a well-founded fear of suffering, persecution on the
basis of a protected ground. To take what is perhaps the easiest example,
some people who have to flee from a civil war may have to flee not merely
because they are civilians in the way of combatants, but because they are
members of a disfavoured ethnic or religious group which would be singled
out for maltreatment amounting to persecution by an approaching army.
Environmental harms may also give rise to Convention refugees. If a
disfavoured ethnic group lives in a remote area of the country, and is
intentionally cut off from aid needed in response to the harm caused by
natural disasters and prevented from safely relocating within the remaining
unaffected areas within the country because of their ethnicity, then they
are plausibly Convention refugees. In cases like this, we should provide
Convention refugee status to anyone who warrants it, even if they could
also be covered by complementary protection. As I will discuss in relation
to mass flight/influxes later, we may have good pragmatic reasons for first
applying complementary protection to everyone in question and only later
screening people to see if they might qualify for Convention refugee
protection, but these pragmatic reasons do not negate the obligation to
provide Convention protection to those who warrant it. Therefore, the fact
that some people who qualify for complementary protection on my
account would also qualify for Convention refugee protection is no inher-
ent problem.
 We might worry that states, eager to avoid the greater duties that come with Convention refugee
protection, will simply grant complementary protection to all people seeking aid and not proceed to
see if any need or warrant Convention refugee protection. McAdam has noted reason to worry
about such practices in relation to the EU Qualification Directive, a form of complementary
protection. See McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. . This is a real worry, but as the most
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The second potential complication to my account arises from the fact
that, while I have said that those in need of Convention refugee protection
‘typically’ or ‘usually’ will need protection for an indefinitely long period of
time, warranting granting them access to full membership and eventually
citizenship, and that those in need of complementary protection ‘typically’
or ‘most often’ need only temporary protection, implying that they do not,
at least at first, need access to full membership and citizenship, there will
be many exceptions to this claim. This is to say, some people who qualify
under current law as Convention refugees would, in fact, be able to safely
return to their homes within a tolerably short period of time, and some
who qualify for complementary protection will not be able to safely return
for significant enough periods of time that it will seem unreasonable to not
grant them full membership. Does this tell against having policies of the
form I have suggested?
I will address later how what is owed to those granted complementary
protection should change over time, as periods of need grow, but the more
basic point should be addressed first. Once we see that we are here trying
to craft just policies, not engage in conceptual analysis or metaphysics, and
see that policies are, by their nature, general, this difficulty loses much of
its force. Policies must be crafted, at least in the first instance, for typical or
usual cases. The existence of cases that do not fit well into the policy, by
itself, does not undermine the basic correctness of the policy. What
matters for crafting a policy is that it get the core cases correct without too
many anomalies, and that there is a way to deal with anomalous cases. We
find this both in the case of Convention refugees (where the ‘cessation’
clause allows for the ending of protection when the threat to the refugee is
in fact short lived) and, at least potentially, in complementary protection,
where threats that turn out to be long term can, and should, give rise to
more permanent protection. Therefore, the fact that there are exceptions
to the general claims about the type of protection needed under Conven-
tion refugee protection and complementary protection is not, on its own, a
likely alternative is not providing protection at all to those who qualify for complementary
protection, I think it is a risk that must be taken.
 This is noted in McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .
 On this point, often missed by philosophers, see M. Dempsey and M. Lister, ‘Applied Legal and
Political Philosophy’, in K. Lippert-Rasmussen, K. Brownlee and D. Coady (eds.), A Companion to
Applied Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, ), pp. –. In particular, the tendency of
philosophers to treat what are best seen as anomalies as (philosophical) counter-examples is shown
to be mistaken when we are considering policies, all of which are, of necessity, both over- and
under-inclusive.
  
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problem for the account presented here, given that each approach gets the
core or most typical cases correct.
 Distinguishing Complementary Protection from Refugee
Convention: Pragmatic and Political Arguments
There are also strong arguments for distinguishing complementary protec-
tion from Refugee Convention protection that are political or pragmatic in
nature. If the great weight of the moral arguments told in favour of
providing the same protection for all in need, these arguments would,
perhaps, not be persuasive on their own, but, given that there are good
moral reasons for the distinction, these more practical arguments can
provide further weight. One reason sometimes given for having only one
form of protection for those in need of international aid is the idea that this
will ensure that a high level of protection is given to all who need it. The
worry here seems to be that, if more than one level of protection is
possible, states will tend to ‘level down’, providing only the lower level.
While this is a legitimate worry, I think that it gets the nature of the risk
wrong. Insofar as we retain Convention refugee protection as a distinct
standard, we maintain that there is a higher standard that must morally
and legally for parties to the Refugee Convention be met. If we move to
create a new standard, one which encompasses both standard Refugee
Convention protection and complementary protection, we are more likely
to get the sort of levelling down feared than if we have two distinct
standards, as there is no reason to think that the higher standard of
Convention refugee protection would be applied to everyone in need of
aid, and good reason to doubt this.
Similar arguments tell against the idea that we should attempt to craft a
single, unified account of protection, one which covers all cases but
perhaps provides protection on a sliding scale of need. Doing so would
risk the possibility of lowering the level of protection to Convention
refugees at least as much as raising the level owed to others in need of
aid. While it is clear that the current Refugee Convention is far from
perfect, it does provide the basis for strong protection to many in need of
 This worry is discussed by both Price and McAdam. See Price, Rethinking Asylum, p. , and
McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .
 For helpful discussion about the wisdom of attempting to institute a new refugee convention, see
L. Ferracioli, ‘The Appeal and Danger of a New Refugee Convention’, Social Theory and Practice,
 (), –.
 See, e.g., the extension argued for in Lister, ‘Climate Change Refugees’.
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aid. Reopening it for negotiation would risk this. On the other hand,
addressing complementary protection on its own would rather provide
another layer of protection to the total tool-kit, one which would supple-
ment the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture, and other
regional and more basic human rights commitments.
 Functional Aspects of Complementary Protection
In this section I will provide detail on the workings of complementary
protection as justified above. I will look at the relationship between
complementary protection and mass flight or influx, at how ‘individual-
ized’ the harm feared must be, and at how complementary protection
should be able to serve as both a shield from removal and a key for entry.
Complementary Protection and Mass Flight/Influx
Complementary protection is often associated with protection for people
in the case of mass flight from danger or influx into a country. Given the
examples listed above of paradigm cases where complementary protection
is appropriate, this is no surprise. Natural or environmental disasters, civil
war, and international war all often give rise to large-scale movements of
people. Furthermore, we may think that large-scale movements of people
call for and justify more streamlined procedures of the sort often associated
with complementary protection. I contend, however, that the connection
between complementary protection and mass flight is only superficial and
pragmatic, not deep or fundamental. There are two reasons for this. First,
as noted briefly before, it is not unusual for people involved in a mass flight
or influx to be properly eligible for Convention refugee protection, at least
when they are carefully evaluated. Revising the Refugee Convention to
cover certain long-term environmental harms will make this even clearer.
This shows that there is no necessary connection between mass flight/
influx and complementary protection.
Mass flight or influx, however, does tend to present difficulties for
traditional Convention refugee protection procedures, insofar as those
are highly individualized and semi-juridical in nature. These procedures
are arguably appropriate when time and resources allow for them, given
the weighty nature of the protection that is, or ought to be, associated with
Convention refugee protection – membership in a new state. However,
when large numbers of people arrive in a short time, such procedures are
often highly unwieldy and cannot be properly applied – certainly not at
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acceptable costs. This suggests that there will often be grounds for provid-
ing a less individualized and less generous protection in the short term for
those involved in mass flight or influx. This sort of immediate protection,
provided to everyone who fits certain general characteristics, for a set
period of time, can be seen as an application of complementary protection,
even it is not the only form.
How Individualized Should Complementary Protection Decision Be?
This raises our next question – how individualized should complementary
protection adjudication be? In the case of Convention refugee protection,
decisions to grant protection are typically highly individualized, in that
they involve particular applications, close inspection of claims, and a need
to show that the applicant meets the relevant requirements of the Refugee
Convention. These decisions are often undertaken in a judicial or semi-
judicial forum, and can require gathering substantial amounts of evidence.
It is at least arguable that the very weighty remedy of granting access to
new membership justifies this relatively onerous process. There is reason to
doubt, however, that such process is justified in the case of complementary
protection.
Persecution on the basis of a protected ground – a core aspect of
traditional Convention refugee protection – involves an intentional
targeting, at least to a degree, of particular individuals. It is at least not
implausible that targets of persecution could and should be able to show
that persecution is taking place on the basis of the protected ground, that
they have a well-founded fear of the persecution, and that they have the
trait in question, at least to the standard of proof properly required for
refugee determination. As seen from our examples earlier, this sort of
targeting is at least not required, and will often be uncommon, in situ-
ations justifying complementary protection. Environmental disasters do
not care whom they harm, and even armies in wars often are not directly
targeting civilians. Even if armies do target civilians, this is usually because
of their location more than specific traits. While some dangers which may
give rise to a claim for complementary protection, such as danger from
criminals whom the government cannot control, may involve a degree of
 The targeting may be focused on the trait – the protected ground – rather than the specific
individual who has it more personally, but it is still a distinct, important feature of the person
who is targeted.
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targeting, we can see here that this is not a necessary feature in the same
way that it is with Convention refugee protection.
Given the above factors, it is implausible to require the same sorts of
individualized evidence and semi-juridical proceedings for complementary
protection, even apart from the lesser degree of protection offered at first.
It should usually suffice to show that the applicant has general features that
make or would make him or her susceptible to the harm feared. For
example, if the protection offered is due to a state-wide natural disaster
affecting a whole country, what would need to be shown is that the person
in question is a citizen of the country in question, and perhaps that he or
she did not have the right to be in any other safe state. While these
procedures would make dealing with mass flight or influx easier, they are
also appropriate for other situations, such as when people already in a safe
state are able to apply for leave to not return to a state where they would
face appropriate danger. In the somewhat more rare case where comple-
mentary protection is applied to people who face some degree of targeting,
but the situation does not fit within the Refugee Convention model (such
as certain cases of fearing crime), more specific evidentiary showings may
be appropriately required, but this follows easily from the fact that there
will not be general criteria to appeal to. In the most common cases,
however, both the nature of the threats that justify complementary protec-
tion and the lesser degree of aid initially offered suggest that less individual-
ized and less juridical procedures are appropriate for determining when
protection is due.
Should Complementary Protection Be a Shield (from Removal)
or a Key (to Enter)?
One major difference between different currently existing forms of com-
plementary protection is whether they provide a means for people outside
a state to enter it to seek protection, or merely provide a shield from
removal to people already in a state to a third state where danger would be
likely. The EU’s Qualification Directive is an example of a form of
complementary protection that provides a key to entry. A person who
warrants ‘subsidiary protection’ (the technical term for the type of comple-
mentary protection provided under the Qualification Directive) may
appear at a border and invoke the law so as to not be turned away. On
 Council Directive //EC of  April . For discussion of the Qualification Directive, see
McAdam, Complementary Protection, pp. –.
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the other hand, TPS in the United States functions only as a shield from
removal for those already in the United States when the protection is
granted, and provides no right to enter the United States for those not
already in the country at the time the protection is ordered. TPS in the
United States provides protection to a broader range of individuals than
does the Qualification Directive, but limits this to those currently present,
so as to avoid serving as a draw for those not already in the country. The
question for this section is whether restricting complementary protection
to serving only as a shield from removal for those already in a country, but
not as a key to enter, is justified by the logic of complementary protection.
While the worry in the United States about its TPS program becoming
an attractor for unwanted migration has some pragmatic force, limiting
complementary protection to only those currently inside a safe country
when the danger strikes would go against the normative logic of the idea.
As has been noted above, one justification for states to provide protection
inside themselves, whether Convention refugee protection or complemen-
tary protection, is that this can usually be done without grave risk to the
state taking in those in need. Furthermore, insofar as the protection is
supplied primarily to those who journey to the state – as opposed to the
state going out on its own to provide the aid – the costs of providing the
aid may be reduced. The later discussion of the normative foundations for
providing complementary protection will further make clear that reducing
it to only a shield against deportation, and not allowing it to be a key to
enter, is normatively insufficient. Therefore, unlike the current US TPS
program, complementary protection should provide a means for those in
need of aid to enter a safe country. Of course, considerations of burden
sharing may imply that the state of first entry need not be the state where
even the sort of temporary protection appropriate for complementary
protection must take place. But, except in the most extreme cases of
emergency, decisions about which state should host those in need of
complementary protection will need to be made after an initial grant
of entry.
 Degrees of Protection, and Changing Protection over Time
Recall that the point of complementary protection is to provide needed
protection to people fleeing dangers other than those that would give rise
to Convention refugee protection, and who cannot receive protection in
  USC. §a(c)(A)(i)–(ii).
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their home states. Once we recall the wide variety of dangers that might
necessitate complementary protection, it becomes clear that not all dangers
require the same sort or degree of protection. (This is one more contrast
with Convention refugee protection since, as I have elsewhere noted, one
of the defining features of Convention refugees is that, whatever the
particular danger they face, they can typically be helped effectively only
by being provided with a new state in which to have full membership.)
Different sorts of protection may be appropriate, then, in responding to
different sorts of threats.
When a threat is either plausibly expected to be short lived or where
movement to a safe part of the home state is reasonably possible, then basic
humanitarian aid will likely be all that is required. This would consist in
providing shelter, food, immediate medical treatment, clothing, and simi-
lar things, but need not consist in more. Such basic levels of aid would be
most plausible for people fleeing natural disasters (or, possibly, some very
limited military engagements) which affect only a particular portion of a
country or which could be addressed within a matter of weeks or, at most,
months. Other threats, however, will predictably last longer. This might be
because of a more significant natural disaster or environmental harm, or
more widespread and significant fighting in a country. In cases like this,
more aid will be needed, such as more secure housing and at least limited
forms of social integration, such as access to education for children, more
significant forms of health care (including at least ongoing maintenance
care), and, if the period of protection extends beyond a few months, at
least some degree of access to the labour market, including aid in finding
work. When the need for aid stretches beyond a few months, but is still
such that return seems plausible in a reasonably short period of time (such
as a few years, at most), then full employment rights and normal education
for children should be made available, as well as access to at least most
forms of health care. Importantly, while these degrees of protection are
presented as successive, there is no necessity that they (or other
 Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’. Price reaches a similar conclusion on the basis of his ‘membership
principle’ and the associated ‘political rebuke’ theory of asylum. See Price, Rethinking Asylum,
pp. –. I explain why my more pragmatic protection-based approach is preferable to Price’s in
M. Lister, ‘The Place of Persecution and Non-State Actors in Refugee Protection’, in A. Sager (ed.),
The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends (London: Rowman and
Littlefield, ), pp. –.
 It may be reasonable to place restrictions on access to healthcare, so as to keep the cost of helping
those in need down. Truly elective procedures may be excluded, and less expensive options taken,
such as providing eyeglasses rather than laser eye surgery. Pressing further into these details would
require more details of healthcare policy than I am able to provide.
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intermediate steps) be followed in order. While basic humanitarian aid will
often be the starting place in the case of mass flight or influx, once the
nature of a situation is well grasped, it may make sense to simply apply the
most plausible degree of protection for that situation, rather than marching
through intermediate steps.
Unfortunately, it is not unusual for situations that could have required
temporary protection to linger on for indefinitely long periods of time,
either because the underlying problem has not or could not effectively
be solved or because further developments complicate the original
problem, making return unsafe and implausible. Many current systems
of complementary protection do not have ways to deal with such situ-
ations. For example, TPS, in the United States, explicitly prohibits
those holding the status from gaining permanent resident status under
most circumstances. There is good reason to reject such schemes and to
insist on eventual access to full membership for those granted comple-
mentary protection for significantly extended periods. Two consider-
ations are useful to look at here.
First, recall that the most important justification for granting Conven-
tion refugees full membership in a safe society was the reasonable expect-
ation that they could not return to their home state within an acceptably
short period of time. If that justifies granting new membership to
Convention refugees, then it would seem to also justify granting full
membership to those given complementary protection in situations where
we have compelling reason to believe that they will not go home in an
acceptable period of time. Having lived a number of years in the host
society provides this knowledge. Second, there are more general reasons to
 A well-known natural disaster case is that of Montserrat, rendered largely uninhabitable by volcanic
activity. When it became clear that the threat was unlikely to be temporary, the second Bush
administration, rather than follow the path suggested here, simply revoked the TPS for citizens of
Montserrat in the United States. While it is perhaps yet too early to say, we may worry that the civil
war in Syria will continue for such a time and degree that an indefinite need for protection is
plausible.
 As noted above, the situation of people from Honduras with TPS in the United States after
hurricane Mitch is perhaps like this, with a mixture of general economic problems and serious
violence from dangerous criminal gangs contributing to this population having TPS in the United
States for more than twenty years.
 We may also ask what sorts of institutional structures are most likely to be able to implement an
adequate system of administration and review here. I cannot hope to answer these difficult, largely
practical, questions in this chapter, but see no intrinsic reason to think that well-crafted state-based
institutions would be less likely to work than would international institutions, especially given the
difficulties of agreeing on international rules and institutions with real bite.
  USC. §§a(f );  USC. §b(b)().  Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’.
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think that anyone who lives in a society for a significant period of time
should have access to full membership. This is most clearly the case for
migrants who are voluntarily admitted, but the reasoning can be extended
beyond these cases. Therefore, if those granted complementary protec-
tion remain in the host country for extended periods of time, they ought to
be granted access to full membership. While there may be some worry
that such a requirement will encourage host states to end protection when
it is still needed – we ought not take this lightly – we may also hope that
this requirement will encourage states to help make home countries safe,
by providing aid, development assistance, or security, thereby allowing
those given complementary protection to return home safely in a relatively
short period of time. Because the justification for different treatment for
those owed complementary protection and Convention refugee protection
is a difference in need, in cases where this difference in need can no longer
be made out, the grounds for different types of protections lapse. When
the normative difference between people owed complementary protection
and those who warrant Convention refuge protection has lapsed, it is
therefore appropriate to provide the same level of protection – access to
full membership – to each. This will be a limiting case for complementary
protection, as in many – probably most – cases, shorter term protection
will suffice, while indefinite protection is the paradigm case for those owed
Convention refugee protection.
 Why Provide Complementary Protection?
The last two (related) questions are, in some ways, the most fundamental –
why should states grant complementary protection to those who need it,
and why think they will or would do this? The two questions are related. If
there is good reason to think that most states will not do what they ought
to, then the obligations of other states may change in light of collective
action problems and free-riding. So, if we want to argue that states should
provide the protection described here, we need to show that it is at least
not largely implausible that they would do it. While these questions are in
some ways more fundamental than those above, the way that the norma-
tive question interacts with the practical one makes it necessary to first
 M. Lister, ‘Citizenship, in the Immigration Context’, Maryland Law Review,  (), –;
J. Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ).
 For helpful discussion of how the passage of time can change moral and legal rights and obligations,
see E. Cohen, The Political Value of Time: Citizenship, Duration, and Democratic Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
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describe in some detail what complementary protection would consist in
before showing if it is feasible and required.
The normative requirement to provide complementary protection has
two grounds. The first stems from a general duty of states to provide aid
to those in need. Several different grounds for such a duty have been
proposed, including a ‘Natural Duty of Justice’, as argued for by Allen
Buchanan, which grounds ‘a limited moral obligation to help ensure that
all persons have access to institutions that protect their basic rights’,
and a duty of humanitarianism, argued for by Matthew Gibney, among
other approaches. These duties may be thought to be owed to other
states, as the agents of their citizens, in the first instance, but in cases
where a state cannot or will not provide protection, shifting the obliga-
tion to individuals in need is the required step. The second ground
relates to the necessary conditions for granting states a right to control
their own borders. We may hold that if states have a right to control their
own borders, this is conditional on such a right not putting others in
unacceptable conditions. The duty to accept refugees, I have argued, is
one plausible constraint on this right. I have attempted to show, in this
chapter, that providing complementary protection is a reasonable further
requirement.
Finally, is it reasonable to expect states to be willing to provide this
protection, given that it potentially creates a duty to provide aid to many
millions of people? I claim that it is reasonable, for two reasons. First, as
McAdam notes, many states already accept some degree of obligation to
provide complementary protection. Given this, the duty set out here
does not create a fully new right, but rather formalizes and clarifies duties
already widely accepted. Second, the duty to provide complementary
protection set out here could form the basis of a new multilateral agree-
ment, similar in some ways to the Refugee Convention, which would help
establish international norms and prevent collective action problems and
free-riding. While an agreement cannot do this on its own, it may be an
essential step toward this end.
 See A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), p. . For helpful discussion of how such a natural
duty of justice relates to questions of protecting human rights, see J. Mandle, Global Justice
(Cambridge: Polity Press, ), pp. –.
 M. J. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), pp. –.
 McAdam, Complementary Protection, p. .
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Of course, even if everything I have argued for in this chapter is
accepted, many questions about complementary protection, both practical
and theoretical, remain. I hope, however, to have shown the basic norma-
tive commitments that follow from a duty to provide complementary
protection, how and why this type of protection differs from Convention
refugee protection, and gone some way toward explaining why states might
take on this burden. If this is so, then the case for complementary
protection is now more clearly made.
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